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Russow: Response 
Davidson, and R. G. Frey, who seem to appeal to the 
Wittgensteinian tradition, argue for a more narrow thesis, viz., 
that animals cannot have certain sorts of mental states, 
although they may well possess other conscious states. 
Carruthers argues that animals have no conscious states, and 
does link consciousness with the ability to use a natural 
language, but does not explicitly invoke Wittgenstein. In fact, 
Leahy is the only appropriate target I am aware of, in that he 
explicitly appeals to Wittgenstein in his arguments to show 
that animals lack "awareness." Absent further references from 
Singer, it is difficult to know exactly to whom he wishes to 
attribute the more extreme claim. 
2 We should remember, however, that for Wittgenstein, 
these psychological states should not be thought of as inner, 
private events--either for animals or humans. 
3 For further discussion of the concept of deception, see 
Russow and other papers in Mitchell and Thompson (1986). 
4 In "How to Change Your Mind" (Dennett, 1978), 
Dennett argues that animals can have beliefs, but not opinions. 
They can come to believe, but not decide, assent, or judge. In 
later discussions (e.g., Dennett 1991, ch 8) he analyzes the 
role language plays in determining what the content of our 
beliefs could be. 
Reply 
Joseph J. Lynch 
California Polytechnic State University 
San Luis Obispo, California 
Prof. Russow invokes a distinction regarding the 
relevance of language to mind that she believes is 
overlooked in my paper. First, there is the thesis that 
some mental states involve concepts that seem to be 
too complex to be captured by creatures without 
language; e. g., dogs might have expectations, but dogs 
cannot expect to be taken out next Wednesday. The 
second thesis is that language may be necessary in order 
to have certain types of mental states. Among Russow's 
examples here is understanding what it is for a certain 
proposition to be true. Clearly, such an understanding 
requires language. So, restrictions of the first kind deny 
certain states to animals due to conceptual complexity, 
while restrictions of the second kind restrict which types 
of states might reasonably be attributed to animals. 
Now, this is an interesting distinction, but I don't 
believe it was overlooked-at least not by me. Russow 
says that Wittgenstein presents the relevance of 
language to mentality in these two distinct ways. This 
may be, but there is little evidence that he had this 
distinction in mind. Indeed, in the passage from the 
Investigations cited in the first section of my paper, 
Wittgenstein lumps together restrictions due to 
complexity of conceptual content (dog cannot believe 
his master will come the day after tomorrow but does 
have other beliefs) with restrictions of type (a dog 
cannot be hopeful). 
Nevertheless, Russow's distinction is a meaningful 
one. To exemplify the distinction, she correctly observes 
that Stich focuses on possible belief contents, while 
Malcolm, Davidson, and others are more interested in 
which types ofmental states animals can have. However, 
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while Stich alone focuses explicitly on conceptual 
content, his argument is against the possibility ofanimal 
belief (indeed, all belief) generally. He does not argue 
that while dogs cannot have beliefs about algebra, for 
example, they can have beliefs about bones. According 
to him, they can't have beliefs about anything, which is 
also the conclusion to Davidson's arguments. Stich does 
have different reasons than Davidson for denying belief 
states to animals, but if either Stich's or Davidson's 
arguments succeed, beliefs are a type ofmental state that 
animals cannot have. l Thus, the distinction between the 
two theses about the relevance of language to animal 
mentality appears to be somewhat blurred. 
The difficulty ofmaintaining Russow's distinction is 
perhaps best illustrated by one of her own examples of 
the second kind of restriction on animal mentality (the 
type of state restriction). An animal might understand 
what it is for a certain state of affairs to obtain but not 
understand what it is for a statement to be true. This seems 
obvious enough. But there's no special type of mental 
state at stake here. Animals can understand some things 
arid not others. Perhaps animals have no beliefs about 
truth, but a beliefabout truth is not a special type ofmental 
state, it's just a belief with a very special content-a 
content too complex to be held by most animals. The 
distinction, then, between the two theses restricting 
animal mentality is quite fuzzy indeed. I suspect this is 
why Wittgenstein did not make much of it. 
Russow correctly points out that the priority of 
language is often invoked in arguments about whether 
or not animals have certain kinds of moral standing. 
Questions about animal mentality need to be answered 
in order to settle such issues. I agree entirely. Whether 
or not a creature can be said to have interests or rights 
does seem to depend on getting answers to complex 
questions about animal mentaIity.2 However, the virtue 
of Diamond's conception of moral community is 
precisely that it does not depend on getting answers to 
all of these questions, important as they may be. Many 
facets of both animal and human psychology may 
remain mysterious to us, but this need not leave us 
morally paralyzed. 
Notes 
I Of course there are important differences in the reasons 
that Stich and Davidson use to support this conclusion. Stich 
centers on specifiability of belief contents, while Davidson 
contends that having beliefs presupposes having the concept 
of belief, which in turn requires having the concepts of truth 
and falsity (see his "Thought and Talk," in Inquiries into Truth 
andlnterpretaJion. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.) 
2 For an interesting discussion from the point of view of 
philosophy of mind on attributing "interests" to animals and 
its relevance to animal liberation, see George Graham's 
Philosophy of Mind: An Introduction. Oxford: Blackwell, 
1988, pp. 186-190. 
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